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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Alston Johnson*
The 1978-79 term of the Louisiana appellate courts contained, as
usual, a great number of cases involving workers' compensation.
Many of these were unremarkable, and a few more are worthy only
of passing mention.1 However, there were several decisions that re-
quire more extended comment in order to assess the judicial at-
titudes toward some of the recent amendments to the Louisiana
Workers' Compensation Act.'
COVERAGE FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
As originally conceived, workers' compensation schemes were in-
tended to remove the burden of industrial and commercial accidents
from injured employees and allocate the cost of these accidents to
the consumers of the product or customers of the business which
employed the injured worker.' The delicate compromise underlying
the scheme required that persons who were not employees, or who
should not be treated as employees, should not receive compensa-
tion for work-related injuries. One of the devices used to assure
their exclusion was a practice, common to many jurisdictions, of
adopting the common law definition of employee in the absence of
any statutory definition, thus excluding any coverage for "indepen-
dent contractors."'
The obvious difficulty with such a distinction was that it was
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Among the decisions requiring only passing mention is an interesting
"threshold" case in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Act, LA. R.S. 23:1021-351 (1950), covered an injury to a
bakery shop employee occurring at a point about midway between the building and the
cab from which she had exited. Lyon v. Entringer Bakeries, Inc., 367 So. 2d 1333 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979). Another decision properly calculated the "average weekly wage"
of a worker when overtime is involved. Skinner v. Boise So. Co., 364 So. 2d 223 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1978). Another approved an award of sixteen cents per mile for an
employee's travel expenses in seeking medical attention. Bonnette v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 367 So. 2d 1261 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). Finally, it was held that a person who con-
tracts to drive a car from one city to another is engaged in sufficient manual labor to
be covered under the Act for injuries suffered in carrying out that contract.
Timberlake v. Avis Rent a Car System, 361 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
2. LA. R.S. 23:1021-351 (1950).
3. This observation was made by Judge Lemmon in Evans v. Naihaus, 326 So. 2d
601 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
4. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 43.10 (desk ed. 1977).
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very often hard to determine whether an injured individual was an
employee or an independent contractor. A closely allied problem
was the potential for disguising employees as independent contrac-
tors so as to avoid liability under the Act.
Louisiana's approach to the problem was blunt and reasonably
effective, though it treated the symptoms rather than the disease.'
A 1948 amendment to the Act excluded an "independent contractor"
from coverage "unless a substantial part of the work time .. . is
spent in manual labor by him in carrying out the terms of the con-
tract," in which case he was expressly covered.' This largely ob-
viated the distinction between "employee" and "independent con-
tractor," since the latter would be covered, regardless of the title
given to him, if he satisfied the above definition.
This provision does not create an employment relationship; it
simply affords employee's benefits to the contractor who qualifies
under the Act and under the same conditions imposed for an
employee's recovery. Since the amendment, the trend has clearly
been to include greater numbers of independent contractors within
the coverage of the Act; but even so, there are limits.
If an independent contractor does not spend a substantial por-
tion of his time in manual labor in carrying out the contract, then he
is obviously not a person covered by section 1021(5) of the Act and
is not entitled to compensation.7 And even if the independent con-
tractor satisfies the manual labor requirement, it must also be
demonstrated that he was performing services "arising out of and
incidental to his employment in the course of his employer's trade,
5. The fact that an individual would spend a considerable amount of time in
manual labor in carrying out such a contract is not significant. It is, however, in-
dicative of the real problem, which is that he might not have an independent business
enterprise which would regard the chance of injury to himself or his other workers as
a contingency to be provided for in advance and included along with the other risks of
his undertaking that are computed in fixing the contract price. It also indicates the
contract price necessary to cover the cost of injury to himself.
6. 1948 La. Acts, No. 179 (current version at LA. R.S. 23:1021(5) (1950)). This pro-
vision provides:
"Independent contractor" means any person who renders service, other than
manual labor, for a specified recompense for a specified result either as a unit or
as a whole, under the control of his principal as to results of his work only, and
not as to the means by which such result is accomplished, and are expressly ex-
cluded from the provisions of this Chapter unless a substantial part of the work
time of an independent contractor is spent in manual labor by him in carrying out
the terms of the contract, in which case the independent contractor is expressly
covered by the provisions of this Chapter.
7. This would exclude, for example, the supervising independent contractor
vividly described in one case as one who "aloofly directs in clean Sunday clothes."
Welch v. Newport Indus., 86 So. 2d 704, 707 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied.
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business or occupation."' This latter requirement, of- course, is the
one applicable to actual employees and is made applicable to the
"working independent contractor" by the definition contained in sec-
tion 1021(5).
It thus appears that an independent contractor seeking compen-
sation must satisfy both of these requirements, and the failure to
meet either of them will result in a denial of compensation. Con-
sidering these criteria together indicates the very reasonable basis
for the exclusion: a person not satisfying both of these requirements
is very likely engaged in a separate business enterprise which
should properly bear the cost of his injury.
During this term and the preceding one,' the Louisiana courts
have returned to this knotty problem, with particular emphasis on
the latter criterion, i.e., is the claimant performing services inciden-
tal to the business of the person from whom he seeks compensation?
This was the pivotal issue in Slocum v. Lamartiniere.0 Defendant
had been engaged in the grocery business for over thirty years, and
he decided that he needed a new building in which to conduct that
business. Rather than hire a general contractor for that purpose, he
decided to engage the various craftsmen directly. Among those he
hired was plaintiff, a carpenter. Plaintiff was paid by the hour and
received a check from defendant at the end of each week; he engaged
in manual labor in carrying out the terms of the contract. During his
work, plaintiff was injured in a fall from a ladder and sought com-
pensation from defendant.
The trial court had dismissed plaintiff's petition, concluding that
his employment was not in the trade, business, or occupation of the
defendant. The appellate court reversed in an opinion in which two
judges joined and a third filed a concurring opinion. There were two
dissents." The majority opinion appears to rest its decision to award
compensation on either of two rationales:
Clearly, Lamartiniere was not building his new store as a
hobby. Whether the building be regarded as a continuation of
the grocery business or a venture into the construction business,
it was a commercial enterprise in every respect and those
8. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (Supp. 1975). Cf. Lushute v. Diesi, 354 So. 2d 179 (La. 1978).
9. In the preceding term, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Lushute v. Dies, 354
So. 2d 179 (La. 1978), held that an air conditioning repairman's dependents were not
entitled to compensation since air conditioning was not an "essential" part of the
restaurant business. See note 14, infr.
10. 369 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 569 (La. 1979).
11. Judge Watson wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Cutrer joined.
Judge Stoker concurred, while Judges Guidry and Doucet dissented.
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employed for the labor are covered by the compensation act.
Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So. 2d 824 (1952); Doss v.
American Ventures, Inc., 261 La. 920, 261 So. 2d 615 (1972).
Here, as in Doss, Lamartiniere undertook to contract the con-
struction of his new store and could be considered engaged in a
second trade or business as a contractor.12
The result reached by the majority is probably correct, but the
ambiguity of the rationale may cause future problems. There is con-
tinued confusion between section 1035 of the Act and section 1061
(old Section Six liability).'3 Section 1035, by virtue of the fact that an
independent contractor engaged in manual labor is to be treated as
an employee, provides compensation if he is performing services
"arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his
employer's trade, business or occupation." No other portion of the
Act is needed to establish coverage, and in fact no other portion is
relevant. Section 1061, on the other hand, offers coverage to the
employees of a contractor (not the contractor himself) against a prin-
cipal who has chosen to carry out a part of his own business through
the contractor and his employees.
The purposes of the two sections are different. Section 1035 is
intended to extend to certain independent contractors the same
coverage that would be extended to an employee of the person with
whom he contracts. Section 1061, however, is designed to prevent
employers from contracting out all or part of their own business and
asserting that they have no "employees" and thus no compensation
responsibility. The fact that the Act extends certain protections to
the employees of a contractor under section 1061 has nothing at all
to do with the contractor's own rights under another section.
But the court found it necessary, in mixing the two sections
together, to assert that "a building is an essential part of a grocery
12. 369 So. 2d at 203.
13. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (Supp. 1975) provides: "The provisions of this Chapter shall
also apply to every person performing services arising out of and incidental to his
employment in the course of his employer's trade, business, or occupation ...." Sec-
tion 1035 is, of course, made applicable to an independent contractor by the definition
in section 1021(5).
LA. R.S. 23:1061 (1950) provides:
Where any person (in this Section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute
any work, which is a part of his trade, business or occupation or which he had
contracted to perform, and contracts with any person (in this Section referred to
as contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any
part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay
to any employee employed in the execution of the work . . . any compensation
under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if the employee had
been immediately employed by him ....
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store."'4 Such an assertion is not necessary, or even pertinent, to
reach a conclusion of coverage.
The defendant chose to supervise the construction himself
rather than use a general contractor. This he had every right to do;
he no doubt also considered that he would thereby save himself the
general contractor's fee. That fee would necessarily have included
not only some profit for the general contractor, but also the cost of
workers' compensation coverage that the contractor would purchase
and would include in his fee.' 5 The appellate court was correct in
deciding that the defendant's choice to be his own contractor placed
him in the construction business, at least to the extent that he was
constructing for himself.
Had the defendant sent a grocery employee (on the regular
payroll) to assist in the construction, there would have been little
doubt that an injury to him in the process would be covered.'"
Defendant should not be able to avoid a compensation responsibility
by choosing instead to "contract" with a laborer to do the same
thing and then insist that his "employee" was not injured, only a
person with whom he had contracted.' 7 It would be unfair to permit
such an individual to "save" costs at the expense of injured laborers
14. 369 So. 2d at 203. The court was attempting to distinguish the recent decision
of the supreme court in Lushute v. Dies, 354 So. 2d 179 (La. 1978). In Lushute, the
court merged the provisions of section 1021(5) with those of section 1061 and produced
a definition of independent contractor/coverage contained in neither section. The
worker in that case was an air-conditioning repairman who probably had a separate
enterprise and perhaps should not have been entitled to compensation. But the court
concluded that it was necessary for his dependents to establish that the work he had
contracted to do was "a necessary part" of the restaurant business of the person with
whom he contracted, even though the definition of section 1021(5) makes no such re-
quirement. Finding that air conditioning was not "essential" to the restaurant
business, the court held that there was no coverage. Distinguishing this erroneous con-
clusion led the court in Slocum to make its assertion that a building is an essential
part of a grocery store.
15. Such coverage would, no doubt, extend to the contractor's own employees as
well as employees of his sub-contractors, to whose claims the contractor might be ex-
posed under section 1061. Thus an owner who was his own contractor might expect in
this way to avoid a substantial premium for compensation coverage, in addition to the
contractor's own profit percentage. 1
16. See, e.g., Vicknair v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 747 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 So. 2d 838 (La. 1974) (compensation for fatal heart at-
tack suffered by plantation handyman while preparing employer's personal camp for
hurricane); Jackson v. Lawler, 273 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973) (employee in-
structed by employer's agent to assist in corralling horses although employed as con-
struction worker; compensation awarded when he was injured while so engaged).
17. To permit him to do that would be to permit him to accomplish the result
outlawed for other principals who contract out their work under section 1061.
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who contribute to the construction process which will produce
economic benefit to the self-styled general contractor.18
In light of the fact that it is clear that the plaintiff did not have
an independent business enterprise and apparently did not negotiate
for his own accident protection as a part of his "contract" price, the
result achieved by the court is laudable. Those who choose to be
their own general contractors will, in essence, have to bear the com-
pensation responsibilities that general contractors bear under the
Act.
But the alternative rationale (that construction is a part of the
grocery business) cannot be approved. Such a conclusion is inconsis-
tent with previous decisions under the Act and, moreover, under-
mines the previous interpretations of section 1061.19 If new construc-
tion is a part of any ongoing business, then any person who con-
tracts for such construction must be deemed to have contracted out
"a part" of his business under that section. In doing so, that person
has a potential compensation exposure under section 1061 against
which insurance ought to be procured. Suddenly, all businesses will
be exposed to the cost of work-related risks in the construction in-
dustry.
This has not previously been the case. A business which entered
into a contract for new construction could be confident that this
18. This is not to say that the principle needs to be so broad as to include the in-
dividual who acts as a general contractor in building a house for his own use and en-
joyment. The fact that such a person might some day profit from the sale of the house
does not put him in the business of selling houses; such a reading would stretch the
definition of "trade, business or occupation" to the breaking point. However, with the
existence of compensation insurance, it would not be incomprehensible to assign com-
pensation liability even to such a general contractor. Risks can be spread horizontally,
as well as vertically, through marketing of a product. Consider the compensation
responsibility of certain groups which do not have a product to sell or a service to
render in the ordinary sense. Meyers v. Southwest Region Conference Ass'n of
Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 310, 88 So. 2d 381 (1956).
'19. See, e.g., Reeves v. Louisiana and Ark. Ry. Co., 282 So. 2d 503 (La. 1973) (con-
structing new petroleum coking unit on premises of refining company held not be part
of that company's business; tort immunity defense raised by principal under section
1061 rejected); Duplechin v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 265 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1972) (construction of additional facility for generation of electric power at plate glass
company not part of that company's business; tort immunity defense raised by prin-
cipal rejected); Moak v. Link-Belt Co., 229 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), modified
on other grounds, 257 La. 281, 242 So. 2d 515 (1971) (construction of new conveyor
system at sugar refinery not part of refinery's business; tort immunity defense of prin-
cipal rejected). See also Hudson v. Aetna Cas. Ins. Co., 299 So. 2d 499 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 20 (La. 1974) (summary judgment in favor of principal in
tort action set aside; worker was employee of contractor engaged to construct new
conveyor system and storage facilities at bulk handling plant operated by principal).
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would not be regarded as a part of its business and that any com-
pensation remedy of an injured construction worker would be
against his own employer or against the general contractor. And
certainly, if new construction is a part of an ongoing business, major
repairs must be as well; and this has also not previously been the
case.
20
These results are beyond the protections of the Act and are not
required by its language. The ordinary construction worker is ade-
quately protected both by his own employment contract and the
right to proceed against principals in that same business. There is
no need to hold that construction is a part of ongoing businesses in
order to protect him. The cost to do so would be substantial.
On the other hand, those who are in business and choose to per-
form as general contractors may be said to assume the respon-
sibilities of general contractors. It would be unfair to permit them to
avoid both the general contractor's fee and any compensation
responsibility to those whom they employ or with whom they "con-
tract."
Thus, it is submitted that the rationale of the Slocum decision
should be limited to its assertion that the defendant had entered the
construction business.21 The alternative rationale offered, that new
construction is a part of the grocery business, is unnecessary and
will prove troublesome in future cases.
LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT: UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE
The employer's right to reimbursement against certain third
persons for compensation paid to an employee' is substantial, but
20. See Fisher v. Cash Grocery and Sales, 316 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975)
(building a canopy on a grocery store not part of grocery's business; thus employee of
carpenter with whom grocery store contracted not entitled to compensation).
21. For a related case decided during this term, see Hebert v. Gulf States
Utilities Co., 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). Plaintiff was employed by a con-
struction company which had contracted with one of the defendants, also in the con-
struction business. It appeared that the defendant wanted a building from which to
conduct its business, and it poured a slab for that purpose. Then it engaged plaintiff's
employer to construct a metal building. Plaintiff was injured in that work and brought
a tort suit against the defendant, which asserted that his exclusive remedy was in
compensation. The court held that since defendant was in the construction business
and was to use the new building in its business, its construction was "a part" of that
business. Thus, under section 1061, plaintiffs exclusive remedy was in compensation.
22. LA. R.S. 23:1101-03 (1950 & Supp. 1976). LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976) provides:
When an injury or compensable sickness or disease for which compensation is
payable under this Chapter has occurred under circumstances creating in some
person (in this Section referred to as third person) other than those persons
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not without some limitations. One such restriction involves unin-
sured motorist coverage. Suppose that the employee, driving the
employer's vehicle, is injured by the negligence of a third-party
driver, who turns out to be uninsured (or underinsured).3 After
receiving compensation from the employer, the employee sues his
own automobile insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage por-
tion of the policy. The employer intervenes, seeking reimbursement
of the compensation paid. The uninsured motorist carrier may seek
a credit against the amount due under the policy to the employee,
based on the policy language reducing any amount payable by "the
amount paid . . . on account of such bodily injury under any
workmen's compensation law.""
It is apparent that the latter claim must first be resolved. If the
uninsured motorist carrier is entitled to a credit for the amount of
compensation already paid to the insured, it obviously would be
completely unfair for that reduced amount to be further decreased
by the claim of the compensation carrier. The hapless employee
would then see his entitlement under his uninsured motorist
against whom the said employee's rights add remedies are limited in Section 1032
of this Chapter, a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the aforesaid
employee or his dependents may claim compensation under this Chapter and the
payment or award of compensation hereunder shall not affect the claim or right of
action of the said employee ....
Any person having paid or having become obligated to pay compensation
under the provisions of this Chapter may bring suit against such third person to
recover any amount which he has paid or become obligated to pay as compensa-
tion to such employee or his dependents.
23. Recent Louisiana statutes recognize "underinsurance" as well as the lack of in-
surance. Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a) prohibits the issuance of an automobile
liability insurance policy in Louisiana unless it affords uninsured motorist coverage up
to the amount of the policy limits for bodily injury liability; the insured may reject the
coverage entirely or select lower limits, but must do so in writing. Revised Statutes
22:1406(D)(2)(b) includes in the definition of uninsured motor vehicle any vehicle as to
which the applicable liability coverage is less than the damage suffered by persons in
the other vehicle and, thus, as to which the vehicle is "underinsured."
24. Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58, 65 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970). In Williams
the following policy language is quoted:
"Limits of Liability
"(a) * * *
"(b) Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because of bodily injury
sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this Part shall
be reduced by
"(1) * * *
"and
"(2) The amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account of
such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disability bene-
fits law or any similar law."
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coverage reduced by twice the amount of compensation he has been
paid. Thus, a preliminary determination of the credit claim by the
uninsured motorist carrier is necessary.
It appears that the Louisiana courts reject such a credit, despite
rather standard policy language appearing to require it. 5 The argu-
ment, quite in keeping with that adopted in other jurisdictions," has
been that Louisiana law has required that (unless the insured re-
jects such coverage) a statutory minimum amount of uninsured
motorist coverage must be issued.27 In light of that requirement,
permitting the uninsured motorist carrier to reduce the amount
specified by the statute by policy language specifying a credit for
compensation paid would allow it to circumvent the policy behind
the minimum requirement. While this has been a proper rationale, it
is subject to the criticism that the statute which requires minimum
amounts of coverage may do so only in order for the policyholder to
receive that amount from that source or others, so long as it was
available up to that amount.28
The Louisiana courts thus appear to have settled the first issue
by denying any credit to the uninsured motorist carrier and thus
assuring to the employee an award of the full amount of the policy
limits for which he has paid, at least where the statutory minimum
is involved. This is probably correct since the legislature, by enac-
ting the statutory minimum requirement, presumably had no intent
to accord to those policyholders injured in a non-employment setting
a greater recovery than those injured in an employment setting.2
25. Gagnard v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (slightly dif-
ferent policy language; policy said not to apply "so as to inure directly or indirectly to
the benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier"; although
issue might not have been squarely presented, court held that that provision was in-
valid); Landry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975); Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), apparently overrul-
ing Allen v. United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 188 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 249 La. 743, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Insurance, 32 LA. L. REV. 270 (1972).
26. See A. LARSON, supra note 4, at § 71.20.
27. For many years, that amount was said to be the minimum amounts specified
by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, LA. R.S. 32:851-1043 (Supp. 1952 &
1977), which were $5,000/$10,000. Very recently, the statute has been amended to
specify (again unless the insured rejects the coverage or selects lower limits) that the
amount issued must be equal to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage which
the insured has selected for his protection against the claims of third persons. LA. R.S.
22:1406(D)(1)(a) (Supp. 1975). All of the Louisiana cases were decided when the bare
minimum amounts of $5,000/$10,000 were required; but it does not appear that the
change in amount (to the amount of liability coverage selected by the insured) would
change the underlying rationale of these decisions. But see text at notes 37-40, infra.
28. See American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 253 Or. 76, 453 P.2d 164 (1969).
29. If, for example, a motorist who purchased uninsured motorist coverage was in-
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But these decisions do not necessarily determine the second
question. Should the employer be successful in its suit against the
uninsured motorist carrier for reimbursement of the compensation
paid? This issue was raised during the past term in Gentry v.
Pugh,0 in which the court held that there should be no reimburse-
ment. The employee had been injured in an automobile accident
caused by an uninsured tortfeasor. He sued not only his personal
uninsured motorist carrier, but the uninsured motorist carrier for
the employer's vehicle as well. The compensation insurer sought
reimbursement for compensation paid (some $10,000). Summary
judgment in favor of the uninsured motorist carriers was affirmed
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. The court held that the unin-
sured motorist carrier was not the type of "third person" envisioned
by the reimbursement statute.
3 1
This seems correct. There would have been an easier answer if
our statute referred to the right to proceed against the
"wrongdoer"; 32 by no stretch of the imagination can the uninsured
motorist carrier be considered a "wrongdoer." But our statute simply
refers to the creation "in some person" of "a legal liability to pay
damages" with respect to the compensable injury. This arguably is
the case with the uninsured motorist carrier. Its contract with the
injured employee creates the legal liability to pay specified damages
when the employee is injured by an uninsured motorist, whether
within or without the employment relationship." Theoretically, the
Act grants to the employer the right to be reimbursed the compen-
sation paid by "such third person."
jured in a completely non-employment setting, there would be no question that he
would be entitled to the full amount of uninsured motorist coverage. But a motorist
who purchased the same coverage, but was injured in an employment setting, would
receive only the full amount less compensation already paid to him by the compensa-
tion carrier.
30. 362 So. 2d 1154 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 922 (La. 1978).
Justice Dixon would have granted a writ.
31. The court did not add, but perhaps could have, that the statute permits reim-
bursement against a person in whom there is created a legal liability to pay
"damages," a term of art which might not include proceeds of an insurance policy.
32. Some state statutes provide for this. Utah, for example, refers to injury caused
by the "wrongful act" of another person. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1975). See A. LAR-
SON, supra note 4, at § 71.20 n.4.20.
33. The appellate court in Gentry noted that the carrier's responsibility was con-
tractual, but it then concluded that such liability would not be included in the phrase
"legal liability." This distinction is probably too fine. The phrase "legal liability" prob-
ably ought to include "contractual" as well as "delictual" liability. The reason for deny-
ing reimbursement against an uninsured motorist carrier is not that it has no legal
liability toward the insured, but that it has no legal liability to the employer. The lat-
ter conclusion is reached on the basis of the policies underlying compensation and unin-
sured motorist insurance.
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One should not lose sight, however, of the purposes of the reim-
bursement action. Regardless of the language actually used in any
given statute, its primary purpose is to cast the compensation loss
upon a wrongdoer who has caused it, in whole or in part. Under or-
dinary circumstances, this results in no loss to the compensated
employee. But in the Louisiana scheme, this reimbursement already
comes from the employee's total tort recovery. To extend this reim-
bursement to a fund purchased entirely by the employee for his own
benefit would be, indirectly if not directly, to make him pay out of
his funds for compensation coverage -something probably pro-
hibited by the spirit, if not the letter, of section 1163. 3
The argument favoring the reimbursement action, even against
the uninsured motorist carrier, is that "double recovery" by the
employee must be prevented. Professor Larson has observed that
there are two kinds of "double recovery."35 One, no doubt that at
which the objections have been directed, describes a situation in
which the employee is permitted to retain amounts from two
sources which will provide recovery beyond his actual damage. The
other, certainly much less objectionable, describes a situation in
which the employee receives amounts from two sources, the total of
which is still less than his actual damage.
Suppose the injured employee is paid some $20,000 in compensa-
tion benefits and his ordinary tort damages would be $40,000. Under
normal circumstances, he might proceed against the tortfeasor or
the tortfeasor's liability insurer and expect to receive a $40,000
judgment, out of which he would be expected to reimburse the
employer the $20,000 in compensation paid. If, however, the tort-
feasor is in fact judgment-proof and uninsured, and the employ(e
realizes $10,000 from his uninsured motorist coverage, he now has
received $30,000 total recovery for his $40,000 loss. To permit the
compensation carrier to extract $20,000 of that amount makes little
sense, and it certainly does not cure some objectionable "double
recovery" on the part of the injured employee.
34. LA. R.S. 23:1163 (1950) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to collect from any of his employees
directly or indirectly . .. any amount whatever, or to demand, request or accept
any amount from any employee, either for the purpose of paying the premium in
whole or in part on any liability or compensation insurance of any kind whatever
on behalf of any employee or to reimburse such employer in whole or in part for
any premium on any insurance against any liability whatever to any employee or
for the purpose of the employer carrying any such insurance for the employer's
own account, or to demand or request of any employee to make any payment or
contribution for any such purpose to any other person.
35. A. LARSON, supra note 4, at § 71.20.
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Suppose, however, altering the example just a bit, that the same
compensation benefits are paid, but that the employee has purchased
a substantial amount of uninsured motorist coverage and may
receive the policy limits of $25,000 in a judgment against the unin-
sured motorist carrier. If he in fact receives such a judgment, he
now holds $45,000 in total recovery for a loss only amounting to
$40,000. One suspects that in this case the uninsured motorist car-
rier would re-urge its argument that it should be entitled to credit
for the compensation paid, distinguishing the earlier cases as involv-
ing a statutory minimum clearly satisfied in this situation." One also
suspects that the compensation carrier will be urging that justice
can be done only by permitting reimbursement of its compensation.
It is apparent from the earlier discussion that one cannot agree to
both propositions.
Even in the second situation, the Act probably does not envision
that reimbursement should take place. It is tenuous to argue that
the "circumstances creating in some person ...a legal liability to
pay damages" 7 for the compensable injury include the purchase by
the injured employee of an uninsured motorist policy, or for that
matter any other collateral sources he may have purchased."8 But
even if that were not the case, the better policy appears to be to
deny the reimbursement. The premium structure for uninsured
motorist coverage no doubt reflects the present state of the law,
refusing to permit the credit against the payable amount for com-
pensation paid from another source. This probably increases the cost
of uninsured motorist coverage. The employee has paid this increased
cost, for all we know, because he wants the benefit of this coverage
(without credit for compensation paid) as an additional protection
over and above compensation which might be payable to him. To
permit the employer to benefit from this collateral source, to the
detriment of the employee who has wholly paid for it, would be un-
fair.
The end result, presumably, is a slightly increased cost in com-
pensation insurance, since this is a compensation loss not reimbur-
sable, except from the insolvent tortfeasor. But on balance, it ap-
36. There does appear to be an emphasis on the statutory minimum requirement
in all of the Louisiana cases; and this may be an appropriate ground of distinction, sub-
ject to the considerations discussed later in this portion of the article.
37. LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976).
38. Perhaps for this reason, in the only case which appeared to address the issue
of reimbursement as opposed to the setoff argument of the uninsured motorist carrier,
the compensation carrier conceded that it was not entitled to reimbursement from the
uninsured motorist carrier but only from the actual tortfeasors (presumably insolvent).
Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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pears better that this loss should fall on the employment enterprise
and its patrons rather than on the employee who purchased a
private insurance benefit.
However, there is at least one argument in favor of permitting
some kind of accounting for the uninsured motorist carrier in the sec-
ond example. If the employee's total damages are $40,000, and he
has received $20,000 from the compensation carrier and $25,000
from the uninsured motorist carrier, it could be argued that the
policy language in the uninsured motorist coverage permitting a
credit does not violate public policy and should be enforced. The
theory would be that there was a clear policy behind the statute re-
quiring those minimum amounts specified in the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Law, 9 and permitting a credit for compensation paid
against that rather meagre minimum amount would violate that
policy. Where, however, that statutory language has been replaced
with language requiring that the uninsured motorist coverage equal
the insured's liability coverage and permitting lower limits or rejec-
tion of coverage at the insured's option, it is no longer so clear that
the legislature has in mind a certain fixed sum of money, available
without deduction. At most, it might be argued that the legislature
contemplates that respect be accorded the insured's wishes, without
regard to a set amount of money available. Such an intent might not
be strong enough to limit the uninsured motorist carrier's recognized
right to contract.
Thus, in the relatively unusual case40 in which the combined
total of compensation received and uninsured motorist coverage
available will exceed actual damages, there is some support for en-
forcing the statutory language, but with modification. In the exam-
ple above, a Michigan court chose a principle which would require
deduction of the compensation paid from the actual damages, not
from the policy limits of the uninsured motorist coverage.41 Thus,
our employee would receive $20,000 from the compensation carrier
39. LA. R.S. 32:851-1043 (Supp. 1952 & 1977).
40. These cases will be unusual to the extent that motorists purchase uninsured
motorist coverage in relatively small limits, as had previously been the case. To the
extent that motorists choose to purchase uninsured motorist coverage in amounts close
to or equal to the amount of liability insurance which they purchase, which is often
substantial, then it is possible that we will encounter numerous cases in which the
compensation paid added to the amount of uninsured motorist coverage payable will
exceed actual damages. Should that become common, one may see renewed interest in
the modified application of the policy language described in the text.
41. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Mesner, 2 Mich. App. 350, 139 N.W.2d 913 (1966).
Mesner was cited by the court in Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1970), and by Professor Larson. A. LARSON, supra note 4, at § 71.20 n.4.28.
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and $20,000 from the uninsured motorist carrier (actual damages of
$40,000 less compensation already paid). The compensation carrier is
entitled to no reimbursement; the employee is paid a total which
equals his actual damages. In those cases in which the combined
total of the compensation and the uninsured motorist coverage
would be less than actual damage, even this modified application
should not be used.
The modified application at least would place the employee on
an equal footing with the situation which would have prevailed had
the tortfeasor been solvent. In addition to the $20,000 compensation
already received, he would have received the actual amount of' his
damages from the tortfeasor ($40,000); but he would have been re-
quired to reimburse the employer for the compensation already paid
him. The only difference would be that the compensation carrier or
employer gets reimbursed if the tortfeasor is solvent; if insolvent,
this loss falls (in the situation in which the combination is greater
than actual damage) on the compensation carrier or employer.'" The
minimal reduction received by the uninsured motorist carrier should
be reflected in lower premiums for this coverage.
The primary objection to be raised by the employee is probably
that the modified application of the policy language appears to per-
mit the uninsured motorist carrier to benefit from a collateral
source available to the insured, when the tortfeasor would not have
the same right as to a victim. But it can be said that, after all, the
uninsured motorist carrier is not a tortfeasor; and it has agreed to
provide certain coverage for a certain premium under certain condi-
tions. Unless those conditions violate clear public policy, they prob-
ably ought to be enforced. In the case of the combined recovery ex-
ceeding actual damage, such a violation of policy is not apparent.
CONFLICT OF LAWS: APPLICATION OF LOUISIANA ACT TO
INJURIES OUT OF STATE
As a part of the major amendments to the Act in 1975, a section
governing extraterritorial coverage of the Louisiana Act was added,
designated Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1035.1.'" Prior to the inclu-
sion of this section, the Act did not address itself to the question of
extraterritorial coverage; and all the rules governing this question
42. In the situation in which the combination is less than actual damage, and
neither reimbursement of the compensation carrier nor credit in favor of the uninsured
motorist carrier is permitted, the loss is thus shared by the two carriers, each of which
would then be paying more than it would ordinarily have expected to pay, in an effort
to compensate the victim as fully as possible short of actual damages.
43. 1975 La. Acts, No. 583, § 4, adding LA. R.S. 23:1035.1.
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had been developed in the cases. The 1975 amendments codified a
portion of these rules and may have gone beyond the reach of
previous jurisprudence."
Section 1035.1 concerns injuries or death suffered "while work-
ing outside the territorial limits" of Louisiana. It provides that if the
injury or death would have been compensable under the Act had it
occurred within Louisiana, the benefits of the Act are available,
whenever it appears that at the time of the injury (a) the employee's
employment is "principally localized" in Louisiana, or (b) he is work-
ing under a contract of hire made in Louisiana. The section further
provides that benefits awarded under another state's workers' com-
pensation statutes do not operate as a bar to an award under the
Louisiana Act, but those benefits will serve as a credit against any
amount due under the Louisiana provisions. 5
During the 1978-79 term, the first decision interpreting these
new provisions was reported. In Stapleton v. Travelers Insurance
Co.,"6 the court dealt with an injury which occurred out of state to
44. References to the employment as principally localized in Louisiana might add
a ground for extraterritorial application of the Louisiana Act which has been little used
in the past, if at all. Stapleton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 359 So. 2d 1051 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1978). See text at notes 46-61, infra.
45. The section does not deal with an injury occurring in Louisiana when the con-
tract of hire may have been made in another state, or when the employment was prin-
cipally localized in another state. Though a legislative statement on the subject might
have been preferable, there is little doubt that application of Louisiana compensation
law to an injury occurring here is sanctioned by both Louisiana appellate and United
States Supreme Court decisions, even if Louisiana has no other "interest" in the affair.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); McKane
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 199 So. 175 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940), cert. denied The
section also does not concern itself with the validity of a clause in an employment con-
tract which specifies that a particular state's law should be deemed to control,
regardless of the place of injury. This does not frequently pose a problem here, but it
is well settled elsewhere that such a clause is unable either to enlarge the applicability
of the statute of the state named or to diminish the applicability of the statutes of
other states. A. LARSON, supra note 4, at § 87.70. It is said that the public has a
substantial interest in the administration of the compensation remedy, and the matter
may not be left entirely to the choice of private contracting parties. A. LARSON, supra
note 4, at § 87.70. Nothing said above, however, should be understood to preclude an
insurer from imposing a limitation upon the territorial extent of the coverage it is will-
ing to afford. There is no reason not to respect an agreement between employer and
insurer that coverage under the policy shall be limited to claims and benefits payable
under the compensation act of a designated state, and the premiums be calculated ac-
cordingly. The Louisiana courts have so held on a number of occasions. Calcote v. Cen-
tury Indem. Co., 93 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 84 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied; Johnson v. El Dorado
Creosoting Co., 71 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
46. 359 So. 2d 1051 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1978). The
opinion was rendered by a five-judge panel, indicating that there was disagreement
[Vol. 40
1980] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 757
an employee who had spent only about three months of kis employ-
ment in Louisiana and the rest out of state. The court emphasized
that the employee's salary was paid from an office within Louisiana;
his work vehicles were registered and licensed here; he received
travel expenses from the Louisiana office for his travel to out-of-
state work locations; and all of his weekly job reports were filed
with the Louisiana office. It reached the conclusion that his employ-
ment was "principally localized" in Louisiana.
This broad interpretation of the phrase is probably correct. It is
of some significance that the statute uses the word "employment"
rather than "business" in speaking of the principal location test. Use
of the word "business," or reference to the principal location of the
employer's business, would no doubt also have satisfied constitu-
tional requisites. 7 But the emphasis on employment indicates a
preference for consideration of the employment relationship as a
whole in deciding the question of the applicability of Louisiana law
to the controversy.
Some states, principally Minnesota, have used "localization" of
the employer's business as a touchstone for application of local law, 8
but even that state eventually broadened its criteria for application
of its own law to something which might best be classified as a
sufficient-significant-contact theory.'9 Choice of "localization" of the
employment in Louisiana, as a determinant for applying Louisiana
law to an out-of-state injury, permits a considerable amount of flex-
ibility in the resolution of conflict of law questions; and this concept
already had support in Louisiana jurisprudence prior to the new
statute and the Stapleton decision.
Consider, for example, the group of opinions in which the conclu-
sion that a Louisiana contract of employment has been formed
seems particularly tenuous. In these decisions, an attempt is often
made to say that it was the intent, though unexpressed, of the par-
ties that Louisiana law be applied to their agreement, wherever
made. An examination of these cases reveals that the factors con-
sidered by the court in divining this "intent" parallel closely the fac-
among the first panel of three judges and the decision below was to be reversed or
amended. LA. CONST. art. V, § 8(B). The five-judge panel was itself split, with two
dissents.
47. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
48. Marrier v. National Painting Corp., 249 Minn. 382, 82 N.W.2d 356 (1957);
DeRosier v. Jay W. Craig Co., 217 Minn. 296, 14 N.W.2d 286 (1944).
49. Houle v. Stearns-Rogers Mfg. Co., 279 Minn. 345, 157 N.W.2d 362 (1968). See
also Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 173 N.Y.S.2d 565, 149
N.E.2d 859 (1958); A. LARSON, supra note 4, at §§ 87.40 & 87.50.
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tors considered in other jurisdictions to determine whether the
employment relationship exists within a particular state.
The genesis of this line of cases is apparently McKane v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co.,' which in fact involved a death within the
state of Louisiana. In that case, it was argued that Illinois law
should be applied because the contract of employment was made in
that state. Although the court obviously entertained some doubt
about whether the contract could be regarded as a "Louisiana" con-
tract or an "Illinois" contract, it expressed the opinion that, in
workmen's compensation cases, this should not be the critical
factor." Rather, the court said, the parties' intent should be para-
mount; and, in determining that intent, one should consider a
number of factors, including the place intended for the performance
of the contract, the domicile of the parties, and the nature of the
work to be done.
This test has subsequently been cited with approval" and is
similar to that used by other jurisdictions. These jurisdictions also
consider the place of the contract itself and the temporary or fixed
nature of the work outside the state at the time of injury." The con-
fection of the contract itself within the state would usually be deemed
to create the employment relation within that state, and this situa-
50. 199 So. 175 (La. App. Orl. 1940), cert. denied.
51. Compare, however, the decision during this term in Boothe v. Universal Tank
& Iron Works, Inc., 360 So. 2d 1371 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), in which the appellate
court reversed the trial court and sustained a declinatory exception to the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction when it appeared that a Louisiana domiciliary had gone to Illinois to
complete an employment contract and was injured there. The decision was reached on
the basis of the law prior to the 1975 amendments. The court felt that Louisiana law
could not apply to such an injury, noting that (apart from the fact that plaintiff was a
Louisiana domiciliary) the only contact with Louisiana was that plaintiff had placed a
brief telephone call from this state to the employer in which he simply sought informa-
tion about job openings. He then left the state to negotiate further and sign the
employment contract. The court said: "There is no indication that either the employer
or employee ever intended the contract of employment to be a Louisiana contract." Id.
at 1373. No doubt this is correct; it might also be said that regardless of whether it
was a "Louisiana" contract, the employment was not "principally localized" here.
52. Welch v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
254 La. 852, 227 So. 2d 594 (1969); Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 19
So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 10
So. 2d 109 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). In
Kilburn v. Grande Corp., 287 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1961), the fifth circuit recognized this
line of jurisprudence but determined that the contract in question was in fact made in
Louisiana, and apparently deemed it unnecessary to use any other basis to determine
whether Louisiana law should apply.
53. See Lewis v. Knappen Tippetts Abbett Eng'r Co., 279 App. Div. 1107, 112
N.Y.S.2d 79, affl'd, 304 N.Y. 461, 108 N.E.2d 609 (1952); A. LARSON. supra note 4, at §
87.40.
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tion would continue until something happens to show that the rela-
tionship has been transferred to another state .5 Under this rubric,
all of the present jurisprudence emphasizing Louisiana as the place
of the contract could be accommodated, with none of the factual
splitting of hairs so characteristic of it.
The new statute governing extraterritorial application of the
Louisiana Act thus appears to offer the opportunity to consider,
under the concept of where the employment was "principally local-
ized," not only the place in which the contract was made 5 but also
other factors, such as:
-the place where the contract is to be performed, if different
from the place where it was made"
-the domicile of the parties 7
-the nature of the work outside the state, temporary or per-
manent"
54. A. LARSON, supra note 4, at § 87.40.
55. There is ample authority for considering this factor in determining whether to
apply Louisiana law, and in truth it must be said that this has been the single most im-
portant factor in the pre-statute Louisiana jurisprudence on choice of law.
56. This factor has been considered by the court in applying Louisiana law to an
in-state injury in McKane v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 199 So. 175 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, and in refusing to apply Louisiana law to certain out-of-state
injuries. Grey v. Decker, 229 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); Cobb v. International
Paper Co., 76 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Abood v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp.,
155 So. 484 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934); Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., 19 La.
App. 494, 140 So. 867 (2d Cir. 1932). It also apparently played a part in the courts' con-
clusions to apply Louisiana law to out-of-state injuries in Ohihausen v. Sternberg
Dredging Co., 218 La. 677, 50 So. 2d 803 (1951), and Kilburn v. Grande Corp., 287 F.2d
371 (5th Cir. 1961), though in each case the court comforted itself by concluding on
close facts that there was a Louisiana contract of hire involved as well. As the court
noted in Cobb v. International Paper Co., 76 So. 2d 460, 463 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954),
the two factors do tend to complement each other:
The fact that the employment contemplated not transient work but work at a per-
manent location in Mississippi adds weight to the conviction that the parties' in-
tention was to have their contract treated as a Mississippi contract where the con-
tract was entered into and where the work was to be performed.
57. This seems clearly to have been a paramount consideration in Babineaux v.
Southeastern Drilling Corp., 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La.
613, 172 So. 2d 700 (1965) (agreeing that Louisiana law could be applied), and Selser v.
Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co., 146 So. 690 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933) (applying Louisiana
law to out-of-state injuries and death). It probably also played a part in the court's
decision to apply Louisiana law in Ryder v. Insurance Co. of North America, 282 So.
2d 771 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Williams v. Travelers Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn.,
19 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, and Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 9
La. App. 108, 119 So. 88 (Ori. Cir. 1928), cert. denied.
58. Reference' is made to this in a number of cases. E.g., Williams v. Travelers
Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 19 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied (apply-
ing Louisiana law); Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 10 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 1st Cir.
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-the existence of insurance coverage based upon the wages and
rates applicable under the Louisiana Act"'
-any other factor which the court feels tends to establish or re-
fute a legitimate interest which Louisiana has in seeing its
compensation scheme imposed."
Consideration of all such relevant factors before making a
choice-of-law determination would probably be more in keeping with
the approach to conflict of law questions already adopted by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in other areas of the law."'
1942), rev'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Abood v. Louisiana Oil Refining
Corp., 155 So. 484 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) (refusing to apply Louisiana law because
"permanent" employment taken up in Mississippi); Hargis v. McWilliams Co., 9 La.
App. 108, 119 So. 88 (Orl. Cir. 1928), cert. denied (applying Louisiana law).
59. This factor, while not prominently mentioned in the jurisprudence, would ap-
pear to be of some importance in determining whether the Louisiana Act on which the
cost of coverage is based should be applicable. See Smith v. Continental Nat'l
American Group, 321 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. La. 1971).
60. Some of these might be the choice of law made by the parties in the contract
of hire, or the principal location of the employer's business, since theoretically the
burden of compensation would be borne most directly by the community in which the
business is principally located. See A. LARSON. supra note 4, at § 86.10; Comment,
Louisiana Conflicts of Law-Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 34 LA. L. REV. 835,
843 (1974).
61. In Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973), and its progeny,
the Louisiana Supreme Court abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in tort cases in favor
of a form of interest analysis which could take into account the place of the tort, the
domicile of the parties, and other relevant factors.
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